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POT IN MY BACKYARD: CURTILAGE CONCEPT ENDORSED 
BY THE QUEENS SUPREME COURT TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL 
EVIDENCE OF MARIJUANA 
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK                              
APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT 
People v. Theodore
1
 
(decided February 13, 2014) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, 
particularly in and around the home, has been recognized for centu-
ries as one of the most treasured rights held by American citizens.2  
The Supreme Court has stated that included within the definition of 
home for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, is the land immedi-
ately surrounding the home, also known as curtilage.3 
Conflicting interpretations of the Fourth Amendment by the 
Supreme Court have led a number of state courts to invoke their own 
constitutions in order to afford individuals greater protection4 against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.5  For example, the federal open 
 
1 980 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014). 
2 See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511-12 (1961). 
3 See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984). 
4 A state may grant its citizens greater protection under its own constitution than that of-
fered under the Federal Constitution.  See People v. Harris, 570 N.E.2d 1051, 1053 (N.Y. 
1991) (“Our federalist system of government necessarily provides a double source of protec-
tion and State courts, when asked to do so, are bound to apply their own Constitutions not-
withstanding the holdings of the United States Supreme Court.”). 
5 See People v. Scott, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1330 (N.Y. 1992) (rejecting the federal open 
fields doctrine and holding that the New York State Constitution provides a landowner with 
a protectable privacy interest in land beyond that immediately surrounding the home, where 
the landowner had taken steps to maintain privacy); State v. Bullock, 901 P.2d 61, 70 (Mont. 
1995) (reconsidering the applicability of the federal open fields doctrine to the Montana 
State Constitution because of “seeming inconsistencies in the decisions of the Supreme 
Court”); State v. Johnson, 879 P.2d 984, 990 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting the Supreme 
Court’s reasonable expectation of privacy inquiry because it was incompatible with the 
1
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fields doctrine dictates that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to 
open fields.6  By contrast, under the New York State Constitution, 
landowners are protected against unreasonable searches and seizures 
in their open fields, so long as the landowner has taken steps to mani-
fest an expectation of privacy.7 
In People v. Theodore,8 the Appellate Division, Second De-
partment held that physical evidence of marijuana should have been 
suppressed due to the violations of the defendant’s rights under the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and its New 
York State analogue.9  The court in Theodore found that the arresting 
police officer conducted an illegal search of the defendant’s home 
curtilage, when he entered the defendant’s rear yard without a war-
rant, and observed the defendant smoking marijuana in his car parked 
at the end of the driveway.10 
The case of Theodore is important because it arose in a 
neighborhood densely packed with homes, where virtually no open 
fields exist.  The case demonstrates the willingness of New York 
courts to apply the curtilage concept to a crowded urban neighbor-
hood,11 and not simply to rural multi-acre homesteads.12  The court’s 
opinion in Theodore springs from a straightforward application of 
 
search and seizure provision of the Washington State Constitution); State v. Kirchoff, 587 
A.2d 988, 994 (Vt. 1991) (rejecting the federal open fields doctrine under the Vermont State 
Constitution, and holding that “[w]here the indicia, such as fences, barriers or ‘no trespass-
ing’ signs reasonably indicate that strangers are not welcome on the land, the owner or occu-
pant may reasonably expect privacy”); State v. Dixson, 766 P.2d 1015, 1024 (Or. 1988) 
(same). 
6 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180.  See also infra section III.B for a discussion of the federal open 
fields doctrine. 
7 Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1338. 
8 980 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014). 
9 Id. at 150, 152. 
10 Id. at 152.  See also infra Section II.C (explaining that the officer’s search also did not 
fall under any recognized exception to the warrant requirement). 
11 See, e.g., Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1330 (holding that the New York State Constitution pro-
vides a landowner with a protectable privacy interest in land beyond that immediately sur-
rounding the home); People v. Machovoe, 662 N.Y.S.2d 949, 950 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1997) 
(affirming the county court’s decision to suppress evidence obtained after a warrantless entry 
into the area behind the trailer home where defendant resided); People v. Sutton, 798 
N.Y.S.2d 712 (Cnty. Ct. Jefferson County 2004) (holding that landowners in upstate New 
York had protectable privacy interest in their open fields and that the officer’s warrantless 
search was unlawful). 
12 See, e.g., Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d 148; People v. Terrell, 277 N.Y.S.2d 926, 930 (Sup. 
Ct. Bronx County 1967), aff'd, 291 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (App. Div. 1st Dep’t 1968) (holding that 
a fire escape was part of the curtilage of the apartment and entitled to the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment). 
2
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core constitutional principles and illustrates the ongoing vitality of 
the curtilage doctrine under New York law.13 
II. PEOPLE V. THEODORE 
A. Facts 
On September 29, 2011, a child called 911 reporting a resi-
dential fire.14
 
 The child gave two addresses—123-06 Rockaway 
Boulevard and 123-06 Sutphin Boulevard.15  Firefighters from a 
neighboring precinct responded to the Rockaway Boulevard address, 
but found no evidence of a fire.16  The 911 dispatcher handling the 
call then radioed Detective Anderson of the New York City Police 
Department to investigate the second address, 123-06 Sutphin Boule-
vard.17  Upon arriving at the second address, Detective Anderson 
found neither a fire nor a house, but a vacant lot.18 
Detective Anderson went to the house closest to the empty 
lot—123-09 Sutphin Boulevard.19  The detective did not ring the 
doorbell; instead, he walked about thirty feet down a walkway to the 
left of the house, turned right, and proceeded into the rear yard.20  
From there Detective Anderson saw Rashid Theodore rolling a mari-
juana cigarette in a car parked at the end of his driveway.21  Detective 
Anderson walked towards the car, announced that he was investigat-
ing a fire, and instructed Theodore to step out of the vehicle.22  Once 
Theodore exited the car, Detective Anderson saw a firearm on the 
driver’s seat; Anderson quickly seized the gun and drug parapherna-
lia, and arrested Theodore.23 
 
13 Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 150-52. 
14 Id. at 150. 
15 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, New York v. Theodore, No. 14-329, 2014 WL 4704642, 
at *3 (N.Y. App. Div. 2d Dep’t Sept. 2, 2014). 
16 Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 150. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at *4. 
22 Id. at *2. 
23 Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 150. 
3
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B. Procedural History 
Theodore was charged in the Queens County Supreme Court 
with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the second de-
gree, and one count of criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth 
degree.24  The defendant sought, “inter alia, to suppress the physical 
evidence” seized on the night of his arrest.25  He argued that the po-
lice obtained the evidence in a manner that violated his Fourth 
Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure.26  The 
supreme court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress.27  Theo-
dore “subsequently pled guilty to the entire indictment” and received 
a prison sentence of three and one-half years.28 
C. Appellate Division, Second Department 
Theodore appealed to the Appellate Division of the Second 
Judicial Department of New York.29
 
 The appellate court considered 
whether the supreme court properly denied the defendant’s motion to 
suppress evidence, or should have excluded the evidence and dis-
missed the indictment.30  The court explained that the protection of 
the Fourth Amendment, in addition to the analogous provision of the 
New York State Constitution, is triggered when police invade an in-
dividual’s constitutionally protected privacy interest.31  Therefore, to 
sustain the supreme court’s ruling, the Appellate Division had to find 
that Detective Anderson lawfully was in a position to make his ob-
servations.32
 
 The Government argued that Detective Anderson’s war-
rantless entry into the defendant’s rear yard fell within the emergency 
aid exception33 to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement, and 
 
24 Id. at 148, 150. 
25 Id. at 150. 
26 Id. at 150-51. 
27 Id. at 150. 
28 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 15, at *5. 
29 Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 148, 150. 
30 Id. at 150. 
31 Id. at 151-52. 
32 Id. at 152. 
33 The emergency aid exception applies when police reasonably believe that an emergency 
exists requiring their assistance, and “there was some reasonable basis, approximating prob-
able cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched.”  Id. at 151.  
Theodore involved two issues: curtilage and the emergency aid exception to the Fourth 
Amendment warrant requirement.  This case note discusses only the curtilage issue. 
4
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the court properly admitted the evidence under the plain view doc-
trine.34 
The Appellate Division reversed and held that Detective An-
derson’s observations were not made from a lawfully obtained point 
of view because he was within Theodore’s curtilage, and additionally 
that no Fourth Amendment exception applied.35 
The court explained that curtilage may be determined by con-
sidering four factors: (1) proximity of the area to the home itself; (2) 
whether the area is located “within an enclosure surrounding the 
home”36; (3) the “nature of the uses to which the area is put”37; and 
(4) the steps taken towards ensuring privacy from passers-by.38  The 
court issued a brief statement concluding that the defendant’s rear 
yard was within the curtilage because it “was in close proximity to 
the home, shielded from view by those on the street, and within the 
natural and artificial barriers enclosing the home.”39 
D. What Was Missing from the Appellate Division’s 
Opinion 
The court’s curtilage analysis was less than rigorous.  Notably 
absent from the opinion was any attempt to canvas the facts concern-
ing the defendant’s rear yard—a step critical to a properly detailed 
curtilage analysis.  Thus, the court left a number of unanswered ques-
tions.  Specifically, what sort of “natural and artificial barriers”40 
must exist to compel a finding of curtilage in an urban New York 
neighborhood?  What was the nature of the thirty-foot walkway on 
which Detective Anderson traveled?41  Also, did a clear boundary ex-
ist between the walkway and the rear yard?42 
The Appellate Division’s superficial analysis is nevertheless 
telling.  The absence of any nuanced details, which might have point-
ed towards a different outcome, indicates that Fourth Amendment 
 
34 Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 151-52 (explaining the plain view doctrine applies when the 
investigating officer sees incriminating evidence from a lawfully obtained point of view). 
35 Id. at 148, 152. 
36 Id. at 151 (quoting United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301(1987)). 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Theodore, 980 N.Y.S.2d at 151. 
40 Id. at 151. 
41 Id. at 150. 
42 Id. 
5
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protections are liberally enforced in the Second Department—readily 
embraced by a critical court with responsibility for core segments of 
urban New York. 
III. FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides, in relevant part: “[t]he right of the people to be secure, in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures . . . .”43  The Supreme Court of the United 
States has identified the entrance to the home as a bright line for 
Fourth Amendment protection.44  Included within the protected area 
of the home, is the curtilage, or “land immediately surrounding and 
associated with the home.”45  The Supreme Court has established that 
Fourth Amendment protection does not extend to “open fields”46 or 
areas within the view of the general public.47 
In 1914, the United States Supreme Court announced the “ex-
clusionary rule,”48  explaining that evidence obtained in a manner vi-
olative of the Fourth Amendment would not be permitted to establish 
a defendant’s guilt in federal court.49  In 1961, the Court in Mapp v. 
Ohio50 extended the exclusionary rule and made it applicable to the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.51  Consequently, the general rule today is that when an unlaw-
ful search or seizure occurs, a defendant may move to have the ille-
gally obtained evidence excluded under the Fourth Amendment.52 
A. Fourth Amendment Analysis: Property vs. Privacy 
Until 1967, Fourth Amendment decisions were based, primar-
ily, upon notions of physical trespass and real property law.53  The 
 
43 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
44 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980). 
45 See Oliver, 466 U.S. at 180. 
46 See generally Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). 
47 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 179. 
48 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). 
49 Id. at 398. 
50 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
51 Id. at 660. 
52 Id. 
53 See, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (upholding the govern-
ment’s eavesdropping because it had not been accomplished by means of actual physical in-
6
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main issue courts have considered in Fourth Amendment cases prior 
to this period was whether the government’s search or seizure physi-
cally invaded a constitutionally protected “place” or “material 
thing.”54 
A major turning point in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
came in 1967, when the Supreme Court decided Katz v. United 
States.55  The defendant in Katz moved to suppress incriminating evi-
dence of interstate gambling that the government obtained using a 
wiretapping device placed on a public telephone booth.56  In this 
landmark decision, the Supreme Court announced that the Fourth 
Amendment exists to protect “people, not places.”57  The Court rea-
soned that because the defendant justifiably relied on the privacy of 
the phone booth to shield his conversation from uninvited listeners, 
he did not forfeit his right to privacy “simply because he made his 
calls from a place where he might be seen.”58 
Arguably, the most important aspect of the Katz case was Jus-
tice Harlan’s concurrence.  Justice Harlan outlined his understanding 
of the two-prong test which the Court adopted as the standard to de-
termine when individuals can successfully assert a Fourth Amend-
ment violation: “there is a twofold requirement, first that a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, sec-
ond, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize 
as ‘reasonable.’ ”59 
 
vasion); Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 134 (1942); Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 
(declining to uphold the government’s eavesdropping because the “spike mike” utilized 
physically encroached upon the petitioner’s premises). 
54 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466 (explaining that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs only 
when “there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his 
papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or curti-
lage’ for the purpose of making a seizure”); but see id. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (ar-
guing for privacy-based, rather than property-based Fourth Amendment protections). 
55 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  See also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177 (describing the Katz test as the 
“touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis”). 
56 Katz, 389 U.S. at 348-49. 
57 Id. at 351. 
58 Id. at 352.  The Court explained: 
The Government stresses the fact that the telephone booth from which 
the petitioner made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he 
was as visible after he entered it as he would have been if he had re-
mained outside.  But what he sought to exclude when he entered the 
booth was not the intruding eye — it was the uninvited ear. 
Id. 
59 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
7
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The Court in Katz recognized, for the first time, that the 
Fourth Amendment’s protection does not turn on the defendant’s 
physical location when the search occurred, but what level and form 
of privacy the defendant was reasonably entitled to expect.60  Follow-
ing Katz, the Court began applying Justice Harlan’s privacy test—
apparently in place of the former property-based test—to resolve 
questions regarding the scope of the Fourth Amendment.61 
B. No Privacy in Open Fields 
Seventeen years after Katz the Supreme Court, in Oliver v. 
United States,62 sought to reaffirm the vitality of the long-standing 
open fields doctrine.63  Oliver consolidated the appeals of two cases 
with nearly identical fact patterns.64  Acting on anonymous or unveri-
fied tips, law enforcement agents ignored “No Trespassing”65 signs 
and fences, entered private property, and observed marijuana plants.66 
Subsequently, both defendants were arrested and indicted for 
manufacturing controlled substances.67  Petitioner Oliver argued that 
under the rule of Katz, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
his field because he “had done all that could be expected of him to 
assert his privacy in the area of the farm that was searched.”68  The 
Sixth Circuit held that Katz should not apply to open fields, because  
“ ‘human relations that create the need for privacy do not ordinarily 
take place’ in open fields.”69 
The majority employed a plain language interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment—arguably a step backwards from the approach 
taken in Katz—and held that the open fields doctrine was still good 
 
60 Katz, 389 U.S. at 351. 
61 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (explaining that the application 
of the Fourth Amendment depends on whether the individual seeking its protection passes 
Justice Harlan’s two-part Katz test); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 n.12 (1978) (ex-
plaining that the old Fourth Amendment common-law trespass doctrine had been repudiated 
by the new Katz expectation of privacy doctrine). 
62 466 U.S. 170 (1984). 
63 Id. at 174. 
64 Id. at 173-74. 
65 Id. at 173. 
66 Id. at 173-74. 
67 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173-74. 
68 Id. at 173 (citations omitted). 
69 Id. at 174 (quoting United States v. Oliver, 686 F.2d 356, 360 (6th Cir. 1982)). 
8
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law.70  The Court reasoned that because the Amendment seeks only 
to protect people, houses, papers, and effects, no protectable privacy 
interest could attach to an open field.71 
As a secondary line of reasoning, the Court rejected Oliver’s 
Katz argument.  The Court wrote that an individual cannot reasonably 
expect privacy in an open field because an open field is generally ac-
cessible to the public and to police surveillance.72  The Court ex-
plained that open fields are different from curtilage, because curtilage 
is viewed as an extension of the home itself—“the area to which ex-
tends the intimate activity associated with the ‘sanctity of a man’s 
home and the privacies of life.’ ”73  By contrast, the majority found 
no societal interest in protecting the privacy of activities that typically 
occur in open fields, such as crop cultivation.74 
The Court also stated that the illegal nature of the defendants’ 
activities (i.e., growing marijuana) lessened the legitimacy of their 
privacy expectations under Katz.75  The Court concluded that no mat-
ter how many “No Trespassing” signs the defendants had posted, 
their expectations of privacy in the open fields were neither reasona-
ble nor “legitimate in the sense required by the Fourth Amend-
ment.”76 
Justice Marshall issued a dissenting opinion in Oliver, calling 
attention to a number of inconsistencies in the majority’s reasoning.77  
First, he argued that the Oliver majority’s plain-language interpreta-
tion directly contradicted the Court’s other post-Katz decisions, none 
of which the Court intended to overrule. 78
 
 Justice Marshall pointed 
out that “neither a telephone booth nor a conversation conducted 
therein”79 could be characterized as a “person, house, paper, or ef-
fect,”80 yet Katz established that both are nevertheless protected.81  
 
70 Id. at 176-77. 
71 Id. at 178 n.7 (“The Framers would have understood the term ‘effects’ to be limited to 
personal, rather than real, property.”) (citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 16, 
384-85)); id. at 180-81. 
72 Id. at 179. 
73 Id. at 180 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)). 
74 Id. at 179. 
75 Id. at 182 n.13. 
76 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83. 
77 Id. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
9
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He observed that curtilage similarly does not fall into any of these 
categories, yet curtilage too has been granted Fourth Amendment 
protection.82  Further, Justice Marshall indicated that contrary to the 
Court’s contention, Oliver’s field was not accessible to the general 
public or the police.83  In fact, the field was shielded from view com-
pletely by trees, fences, and other natural embankments.84 
Justice Marshall concluded his dissent by stating a rule that he 
believed would best serve citizens, law enforcement, and the lower 
courts: 
Private land marked in a fashion sufficient to render 
entry thereon a criminal trespass under the law of the 
State in which the land lies is protected by the Fourth 
Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches 
and seizures.  One of the advantages of the foregoing 
rule is that it draws upon a doctrine already familiar to 
both citizens and government officials.  In each juris-
diction, a substantial body of statutory and case law 
defines the precautions a landowner must take in order 
to avail himself of the sanctions of the criminal law.  
The police know that body of law, because they are 
entrusted with responsibility for enforcing it against 
the public; it therefore would not be difficult for the 
police to abide by it themselves.85 
To the contrary, Justice Marshall predicted that the majority’s rule 
would create an influx of litigation because it would require police to 
make “on-the-spot judgments as to how far curtilage extends,”86 just 
to be litigated later by courts on a case-by-case basis.87 
 
82 Id. at 185-86.  Justice Marshall argued: 
Indeed, the Court's reading of the plain language of the Fourth Amend-
ment is incapable of explaining even its own holding in this case.  The 
Court rules that the curtilage, a zone of real property surrounding a 
dwelling, is entitled to constitutional protection.  We are not told, how-
ever, whether the curtilage is a ‘house’ or an ‘effect’—or why, if the cur-
tilage can be incorporated into the list of things and spaces shielded by 
the Amendment, a field cannot. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
83 Id. at 184-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
84 Id. at 174. 
85 Id. at 195. 
86 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 195-96 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
87 Id. at 196. 
10
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In sum, Oliver instructed that Fourth Amendment protection 
would not extend to land falling outside of the curtilage, regardless of 
steps taken to assure privacy.88  However, the majority offered little 
guidance on how to distinguish between curtilage and open fields.89  
The opinion also left unaddressed the issue of whether and to what 
extent the curtilage concept might apply in a relatively dense urban 
environment. 
IV. POST-OLIVER CURTILAGE:  CURTILAGE OR OPEN FIELDS 
Four years later, in United States v. Dunn,90 the Supreme 
Court attempted to shed light on the issues left open in Oliver.91  Spe-
cifically, it analyzed how law enforcement officers and lower courts 
should determine where the curtilage ends and the open fields 
begin.92  The defendants in Dunn were charged with manufacturing a 
controlled substance after Drug Enforcement Agents observed evi-
dence of illicit drug activity through the window of the defendant’s 
barn.93  The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the barn fell 
within the curtilage, which would have rendered unlawful the of-
ficer’s visual flashlight search conducted through the barn window.94 
Drawing from its own previous cases, the Supreme Court 
proposed four factors to assist lower courts in resolving the question 
of whether an area is intimately tied to the home itself: (1) the prox-
imity of the land in question to the home; (2) whether the land is 
within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature of its use; 
and (4) the steps taken towards ensuring privacy in the land.95  The 
Court further added that these factors will not “produce[] a finely 
tuned formula that, when mechanically applied, yields a ‘correct’ an-
swer to all extent-of-curtilage questions.  Rather, these factors are 
useful analytical tools only to the degree that, in any given case, they 
bear upon the centrally relevant consideration.”96  The Court ulti-
mately concluded that Dunn’s barn was not within the curtilage be-
 
88 Id. at 179. 
89 Id. at 180 n.11. 
90 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
91 Id. at 296. 
92 Id. at 301. 
93 Id. at 298-99. 
94 Id. at 299-300. 
95 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 301. 
96 Id. at 301. 
11
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cause (1) it was located sixty yards away from the home itself; (2) it 
was located fifty yards outside of the fenced area that surrounded the 
home; (3) the officers believed that it was being used as a drug lab; 
and (4) a separate fence surrounding the barn offered no privacy be-
cause it was “constructed to corral livestock, not to prevent persons 
from observing what lay inside the enclosed areas.”97 
Justice Brennan, who was joined by Justice Marshall, au-
thored a dissenting opinion that rejected the majority’s opinion in its 
entirety.98  He believed that the majority’s application of the four-part 
test disregarded the significance of a barn to rural life.99  Justice 
Brennan wrote that the Court’s willingness to reject privacy in open 
fields, and its unwillingness to recognize privacy in the defendant’s 
barn, “are manifestly inconsistent and reflect a hostility to the pur-
pose of the Fourth Amendment.”100 
Since Dunn, courts have varied in their interpretations of the 
four factors, further demonstrating that there are neither clear-cut an-
swers, nor bright line rules useful for resolving questions of home 
curtilage.101 
V. THE NEW YORK STATE APPROACH 
A. Open Fields in New York 
In 1992, the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Scott102 
considered whether to adopt the Supreme Court’s ruling in Oliver re-
garding the open fields doctrine.103  The Court of Appeals rejected the 
federal open fields doctrine because of its uncertainty, and imple-
mented a standard that it believed would better protect its citizens’ 
 
97 Id. at 302-03. 
98 Id. at 307 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
99 Id. 
100 Dunn, 480 U.S. at 310 (emphases added). 
101 See, e.g., United States v. Reilly, 76 F.3d 1271, 1278 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying “actual 
use” test to determine what actual uses were made of the alleged curtilage, and analyzing 
whether those uses qualified as “intimate activities of the home”); contra United States v. 
Shates, 915 F. Supp. 1483, 1498 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (considering the officers’ objective obser-
vations of the alleged curtilage to determine nature of use factor); see also United States v. 
Ishmael, 843 F. Supp. 205, 209 (E.D. Tex. 1994) (“[T]here are no bright lines that determine 
where the curtilage of a home ends.”), rev’d on other grounds, 48 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1995). 
102 593 N.E.2d 1328 (N.Y. 1992). 
103 Id. at 1330. 
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privacy rights.104  The New York State Constitution now protects pri-
vately owned open fields against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
as long as the landowner has made efforts on the land to manifest an 
expectation of privacy.105 
The case of Scott presented facts remarkably similar to those 
considered by the Supreme Court in Oliver.106  Law enforcement of-
ficers received information from a private citizen that marijuana was 
being grown in a field on the defendant’s property.107  Despite clear 
signs prohibiting trespassing, the officers subsequently searched the 
field, seized evidence, and arrested the defendant on charges of crim-
inal possession of marijuana.108  The court ultimately held that Oliver 
“d[id] not adequately protect [the] fundamental constitutional rights” 
of New York citizens.109 
The majority cited three main reasons for its decision.110  
First, the court explained that the rule of Oliver is contrary to New 
York decisions regarding searches and seizures.111  The court wrote 
that since Katz, New York courts have consistently applied the rule 
that the Fourth Amendment “protects a person’s privacy, not particu-
lar places”112 and to adopt the rule of Oliver would undermine New 
York law.113 
Second, the court found Oliver to be in direct conflict with 
“the right to be let alone”114—a core New York principle.115  This 
right, the court explained, is rooted in New York search and seizure 
jurisprudence, and is similarly recognized by the legislature through 
the enactment of statutes.116  Specifically, the court found that New 
York’s criminal trespass statute117 represented a societal recognition 
 
104 Id. at 1338. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 1330-31. 
107 Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1330-31. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 1337. 
111 Id. at 1335. 
112 Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1334. 
113 Id. at 1336. 
114 Id. at 1335 (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.10(a) (McKinney 2012) (“A person is guilty of criminal 
trespass in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
upon real property (a) which is fenced or otherwise enclosed in a manner designed to ex-
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of the right to exclude the public as “one of the most treasured 
strands in [a New York] owner’s bundle of property rights.”118 
Finally, the court took issue with the Supreme Court’s propo-
sition that “the very conduct discovered by the government’s illegal 
trespass (i.e., growing marijuana) could be considered as a relevant 
factor in determining whether the police had violated defendant’s 
rights.”119  Agreeing with Justice Marshall’s Oliver dissent, the court 
reasoned that Fourth Amendment protections should not turn on the 
legality of the activities sought to be kept private.120  The court found 
“[s]uch after-the-fact-justification”121 to be incompatible with New 
York’s longstanding recognition of fundamental fairness in criminal 
justice.122 
As an additional line of reasoning, the court found that Oliver 
was incompatible with New York law because Oliver “presupposes 
the ideal of a conforming society,”123 where law-abiding citizens 
should have nothing to hide.124  According to Scott, this rationale 
seemed contrary to New York’s tradition of tolerating “the unconven-
tional . . .  bizarre or even offensive.”125  The court concluded that for 
these reasons, it was compelled to reject Oliver, and turn instead to 
the analogous provision of the New York State Constitution to ade-
quately safeguard its citizens’ rights.126 
B. New York Curtilage 
During the years since Scott, New York courts consistently 
have invoked the curtilage concept to exclude evidence seized from 
 
clude intruders.”). 
118 Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1335-36 (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV 
Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982)).  The court wrote that it would not ignore the police’s 
commission of both civil and criminal trespass when they searched the defendants’ proper-
ties.  Id. at 1336.  Quoting Justice Brandeis, the court explained, “ ‘Our Government is the 
potent, the omnipresent teacher.  For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its exam-
ple.  Crime is contagious.  If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for 
law.’ ” Id. (quoting Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 485 (Brandeis, J., dissenting)). 
119 Id. at 1336. 
120 Id. at 1333-34 n.2, 1336.  For a discussion of Justice Marshall’s dissent in Oliver, see 
supra text accompanying notes 77-87. 
121 Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1336. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 1337. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Scott, 593 N.E.2d at 1338. 
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non-rural home yards.  In People v. Saurini,127 the Appellate Division 
for the Fourth Judicial Department held that the warrantless seizure 
of marijuana plants growing in flower beds immediately behind the 
defendant’s home could not be justified by either the plain view or 
open fields doctrines because the police officers made their observa-
tions from an adjoining neighbor’s rear yard.128 
In People v. Vernon B.,129 the Supreme Court, Kings County, 
held that the defendant’s unkempt rear yard was within the curtilage 
of his Brooklyn home, and thus fell under the home’s umbrella of 
Fourth Amendment protection.130  In Vernon B., a police officer al-
legedly observed the defendant toss a black bag out of his bedroom 
window.131  The officer then jumped over the defendant’s fence to re-
trieve the discarded bag containing a loaded handgun.132  The defend-
ant was charged with criminal possession of a weapon and moved to 
suppress the evidence on the grounds that the officer’s warrantless 
search and seizure were unlawful.133 
The court conducted the four-factor Dunn analysis and held 
that the yard, although overgrown and seemingly neglected, was 
within the curtilage because the resident intended that it be treated as 
part of the home.134  The yard was immediately next to the home, ex-
tended behind the home for only twenty feet, and was enclosed by a 
fence.135  Although the fence was chain-linked and did not shield the 
yard from public view, the court found that the resident took steps to 
protect the yard from public view because it was overgrown with 
vegetation.136  The court stated that the record shed no light as to the 
nature of use factor, but deduced from the overgrowth of vegetation 
 
127 607 N.Y.S.2d 518 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t 1994). 
128 Id. at 519.  But see Commonwealth v. Busfield, 363 A.2d 1227, 1229 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1976).  Police obtained permission from the defendant’s neighbor to look into defendant’s 
kitchen window from the neighbor’s adjoining property.  Id.  The court admitted the officer’s 
observations as evidence and held that “even though a [sheer] curtain was drawn across the 
window,” the defendant “exposed his transactions to the public.” Id. 
129 954 N.Y.S.2d 835, 838 (Crim. Ct. Kings County 2012). 
130 Vernon B., 954 N.Y.S.2d at 838 (quoting Dunn, 480 U.S. at 300-01).  The court ulti-
mately excused the officer’s warrantless search and seizure because it found that the Fourth 
Amendment exigent circumstance exception applied.  Id. at 841. 
131 Id. at 837. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 836. 
134 Vernon B., 954 N.Y.S.2d at 838. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
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that it must have been neglected.137  Nevertheless, the court found 
that the vegetation could be viewed as a “step taken by the resident to 
protect the yard from observation.”138  The court concluded, rather 
dubiously, that the yard qualified as curtilage.139 
The court also went on to say that the officer’s unlicensed en-
try onto the defendant’s property was “consistent with New York’s 
statutory definition of trespass.”140  Therefore, although the officer 
made his observation from a lawful vantage point (i.e., outside the 
curtilage), he “trespass[ed] onto a constitutionally protected area”141 
when he jumped over the fence into the defendant’s rear yard.142 
New York courts in cases such as Theodore and Vernon B. 
consistently have endorsed the curtilage doctrine to include urban 
yards within the home’s protected core. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
As the Supreme Court has revisited the Fourth Amendment 
over time, it has expanded the basic concepts of home protection to 
embrace various American developments such as multi-acre home-
steads and urban home-sites.  Today, the home as a concept is de-
fined expansively for purposes of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
and includes all of the various settings within which Americans live. 
New York’s protection of the home against unreasonable 
searches and seizures exceeds the protection available under the Fed-
eral Constitution.  Illustrative in this regard, New York citizens who 
live in the wide-open country with enormous tracts of land remain 
entitled to a cognizable level of home-invasion protection, so long as 
the landowner has made efforts to maintain privacy.  Citizens who 
live in densely populated urban settings also have curtilage rights, as 
demonstrated in People v. Theodore.143  It is understandable and quite 
predictable that a court such as the Second Department, responsible 
for one of the most densely populated urban environments in the na-
tion, would not hesitate to defer to the expectation of privacy in the 
 
137 Id. 
138 Id. 
139 Vernon B., 954 N.Y.S.2d at 838. 
140 Id. at 838-39. 
141 Id. at 839. 
142 Id. 
143 980 N.Y.S.2d 148 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2014). 
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 31 [2015], No. 4, Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol31/iss4/10
2015 CURTILAGE CONCEPT 827 
backyard typical for that particular neighborhood. 
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